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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: Case No. 890478-CA 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : Priority #2 
vs. : 
: BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SANTIAGO DIAZ CRESPO, : 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction 
rendered against appellant in the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, 
presiding, for unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, 
consenting or arranging to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended). This 
Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In asserting ineffective assistance of counsel as an 
issue on appeal, the standard for review is first, that the 
appellant must show that the counsel's performance was 
deficient, and, second, that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984); State v. Montes, 
151 Utah. Adv. Rep. 28. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was appellant denied effective assistance of counsel 
because trial counsel failed to challenge for cause a 
prospective juror who expressed a concern about being impartial 
in a drug case? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
The Constitutional provisions and statutes relevant to 
a determination of this case are: 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the state and district wherein the crime 
shrill have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
in his favor, and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV: 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the 
United States and of the state wherein they 
reside. No state shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any state deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law, nor deny to any person 
within his jurisdiction the equal 
protections of the law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii): 
Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly 
and intentionally: . . . (ii) distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance or to 
agree, consent, offer or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1953 as amended): 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the 
defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the 
examination. In the later event, the court 
may permit counsel or the defendant to 
supplement the examination by such further 
inquiry as it deems proper, or may itself 
submit to the prospective jurors' additional 
questions requested by counsel or the 
defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the 
panel or to an individual juror. 
(2) A challenge to an individual 
juror may be either preemptory or for 
cause. A challenge to an individual juror 
may be made only before the jury is sworn to 
try the action, except the court may, for 
good cause, permit it to be made after the 
juror is sworn, but before any of the 
evidence is presented. In challenges for 
cause, the rules relating to challenges to a 
panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All 
challenges for cause shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an 
objection to a particular juror and may be 
taken on one or more of the following 
grounds: 
(14) That a state of mind exists 
on the part of the juror with reference to 
the cause, or to either party, which will 
prevent him from acting impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights 
of the party challenging; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason 
of having formed or expressed an opinion 
upon the matter or cause to be submitted to 
such jury, founded upon public rumor, 
statements in public journals, or common 
notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to 
the court that the juror can and will, 
notwithstanding such opinion, act 
impartially and fairly upon the matter to be 
submitted to him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Santiago Diaz Crespo, was charged by 
Information with three counts of unlawful distribution, 
offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended). 
On May 4, 1989, the jury found appellant guilty of all 
three counts. The trial court, on June 12, 1989, sentenced 
appellant to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years at the 
Utah State Prison on each of the three counts. Appellant filed 
a Notice of Appeal on August 1, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 7, 9 and 14, 1988, Detective Zane Smith 
purchased different quantities of a controlled substance from 
appellant Santiago Crespo. (Vol. II, Tr. 12, 20, 25.) 
Detective Smith further testified that he obtained a photograph 
and used it to identify the appellant as the person he had been 
transacting the drug deals with. (Vol. II, Tr. 30-31.) 
After receiving the testimony of various chain-of-
custody witnesses, the state called David S. Murdock from the 
Department of Public Safety and the State Crime Lab. He 
testified that as a criminalist he presently conducts chemical 
analysis on drugs to identify controlled substances. (Vol. II, 
Tr. 56.) After explaining the number of tests that he had 
performed, Murdock testified that cocaine was present in the 
white powder which had been received by Detective Zane Smith 
from the appellant. (Vol. II, Tr. 64.) 
During jury selection, the trial court judge 
questioned jurors concerning any of the "panel that has any 
involvement with drugs, illegal drugs, whether in your personal 
problems or drug problems, or members of your family?" (Vol. 
I, Tr. 15.) In response to this question, prospective jurors 
Swenson, Hudson, Sorenson and Harper raised their hands. After 
further questioning of all prospective jurors, the court then 
advised everyone that it would question the prospective jurors 
listed above in the privacy of chambers. Each of the 
prospective jurors was then called into chambers for individual 
questioning. (Vol. I, Tr. 29.) 
Prospective juror Nola Swenson was called into 
chambers and was questioned by the court. She related that her 
son is presently addicted to cocaine. The trial judge then 
advised her that the defendant in the case has charges "brought 
against him involving drugs and selling and so forth. . . . Is 
there anything in regards to your experience with your son and 
the problems that have arisen out of that that would impair in 
any way your ability to sit in judgment on this case and to be 
perfectly fair with both the state and the defendant in 
arriving at that decision?" Prospective juror Swenson 
testified that she would be fair. 
The court continued in its inquiry and asked whether 
she would be prejudiced or biased one way or the other, against 
or for either Mr. Crespo or the state, and she responded, "I 
think I could be honest and fair." The court then continued, 
"Do you know that?" And she responded, "Well, I guess you 
don't know until you hear the facts." (Tr. 21-22.) After 
further questioning, prospective juror Swenson stated, "Well, I 
am very angry at the drug problems." (Tr. 23.) After a couple 
of questions from counsel for the defendant, and none from the 
prosecution, the court asked prospective juror Swenson to 
return back to her chair. 
The next prospective juror called into chambers for 
questioning was Elysa Hudson who stated that a nephew had been 
both a user and a pusher. She described him as having been 
convicted for breaking and entering, theft by deception, and 
that he had stolen from members of the family who were all just 
terrified by him. Apparently he was using these illegal gains 
to support his habit. The situation had gotten so bad that she 
had had to install a burglar alarm system in her home. After 
explaining this to the court and counsel, the court inquired 
whether the feelings that she presently had would prevent her 
from being an impartial juror in the case. The prospective 
juror Hudson responded, "You know, I would try not to, but I am 
afraid it would because I know so personally the terror of 
dealing with someone that is addicted to drugs." (Vol. I, 
Tr. 24.) 
The court questioned her further regarding whether she 
would be able to judge the case only on the facts, without her 
personal problems influencing her decision, to which she 
responded, "I just don't know if its humanly possible to say 
you can dismiss all the things that affect you emotionally and 
be totally rational. I would try to, but I can't say that I 
could just accomplish that to the degree that would be 
necessary." (Vol. I, Tr. 25.) At that point, there were no 
further questions from the state or defense counsel, nor was 
there a motion to recuse this prospective juror from the venire. 
After questioning two other prospective jurors who had 
raised their hand, the court inquired of counsel for the state 
and the defendant whether they had any further questions. In 
response, trial counsel for appellant stated, "No. I think you 
covered most of my questions. I was primarily concerned about 
drug involvement and drug attitudes." (Vol. I, Tr. 28.) The 
only other inquiries from the court at that point were as to 
the length that counsel anticipated the trial would take. 
After that, court and counsel, and the defendant, all returned 
back to the courtroom with the jury. (Vol. I, Tr. 29.) 
In court, trial counsel for appellant in response to 
the court's inquiry whether he passed the jury for cause, 
stated, "Your Honor, as previously indicated, I would have one 
challenge." To which the court responded, "Other than that one 
question?", and counsel stated, "No, Your Honor. I would pass 
the jury for cause." (Vol. I, Tr. 29.) There is no indication 
on the record of any discussion in chambers or otherwise that 
would indicate trial counsel's objection and challenge to any 
of the prospective jurors. A review of the record below, 
however, reflects that Mrs. Swenson was seated as a juror. 
(Vol. I, Tr. 33.) 
The jury found appellant guilty of three counts of 
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or 
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
a second degree felony as charged in Counts I, II and III of 
the Information. (Vol. 3, Tr. 27-28.) On June 12, 1989, the 
trial court sentenced appellant to concurrent terms of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. (Vol. Ill, Tr. 34-35.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in 
failing to challenge for cause juror Nola Swenson who expressed 
concern about being impartial in a drug case. Counsel's error 
was prejudicial to appellant and, absent such error, the 
outcome of the trial could quite likely have been different. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE 
FOR CAUSE A PROSPECTIVE JUROR WHO EXPRESSED A 
CONCERN ABOUT BEING IMPARTIAL IN A DRUG CASE. 
During voir dire in the instant case, juror Swenson 
stated that she was very angry at the drug problems. Upon 
questioning by appellant's trial counsel on whether her anger 
spilled over to people that supply drugs, she replied, "I don't 
know who that is." (Vol. 1, Tr. 23.) Trial counsel below 
failed to further question Mrs. Swenson about her ability to 
remain impartial in rendering a verdict. Trial counsel also 
did not challenge her for cause. (Vol. 1, Tr. 23.) 
Appellant's position is that his trial counsel was ineffective 
by not challenging Mrs. Swenson for cause and that this 
ineffectiveness ultimately prejudiced his case before the jury. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18(e)(14) authorizes challenges 
of jurors for cause when the prospective juror expresses a 
state of mind with reference to the cause or to either party 
which could prevent the juror from being impartial. Mrs. 
Swenson's son's involvement in drugs led her to state on the 
record that she was very angry at the overall drug problem. 
This statement warrants an instant challenge for cause in that 
Mrs. Swenson could be presumed to have found appellant guilty 
even before trial. 
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) stands for the 
proposition that a criminal defendant in a state court is 
guaranteed an "impartial jury" by the Sixth Amendment as 
applicable to the state through the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
1977) has also held that "Article I, § 12, Constitution of Utah 
. . . guarantees the accused . . . a trial by an impartial 
jury." When counsel below failed to challenge for cause a 
venireman who expressed bias against the defendant, all 
elements are present for ineffective assistance of counsel 
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
This Court has recently enunciated the heavy burden 
appellants face in presenting an ineffective assistance of 
counsel argument. In State v. Montes, 151 Utah Advance Reports 
28 (Ut. App. Jan. 8, 1991), this Court reiterated that a 
convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so 
defective as to require reversal of a conviction has two 
components. The first component must establish that counsel's 
performance was deficient, and the second component must 
establish that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. Citing Strickland v. Washington. 
In Presley v. State, 750 S.W.2nd 602 (Mo. App. 1988), 
appellant who had been convicted of several sexual offenses, 
moved the court to vacate the judgment and sentence on the 
grounds that he had been denied the effective assistance of 
counsel at trial. The court found that counsel's failure to 
challenge for cause a venireman who stated during voir dire 
that he would be partial to the state, was ineffective. The 
appellate court, in affirming the lower court on the rationale 
that counsel's error in not challenging the venireman, though 
arguably a mistake, held that it still fell below the 
threshold standard required for competent counsel. The court 
further found that: 
The instant situation . . . is an 
example of the type the court envisioned by 
the language in Strickland: "In certain 
Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is 
presumed." There was here a denial of the 
right to trial by jury. This fits the 
Strickland language . . . that "prejudice in 
these circumstances is so likely that 
case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not 
worth the cost." 
Presley, 750 S.W.2nd at 607. 
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the 
court held under Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-18(2) (1953, as 
amended), that a juror may be challenged and removed for cause 
if actual bias is shown. In determining actual bias, the court 
stated that if: 
. . . the state of mind of the juror leads 
to a just inference in reference to the 
cause of the parties that he will not act 
with entire impartiality. . . . Furthermore, 
when a juror has expressed an attitude 
indicating prejudice or bias, such cannot be 
attenuated by the juror's determination that 
he can render an impartial verdict. The 
juror cannot be the judge of his 
qualification. . . . 
Id. at 884. 
Applying specifically the rationale of Brooks, as well 
as the other cases cited herein, appellant submits that his 
trial counsel erred in not challenging for cause Mrs. Swenson 
who stated and expressed an opinion and a state of mind that 
she was very angry at the drug problems. (Vol. 1, Tr. 29.) 
After expressing this concern and this anger, she was not 
further questioned by the court to determine whether she, in 
fact, could be rehabilitated. Trial counsel who had the 
responsibility, failed to exercise a challenge for cause when 
it was obvious that it was necessary. 
Applying the Strickland standard to the instant case, 
appellant submits the trial counsel should have known that Mrs. 
Swenson was biased. Her state of mind was such with anger at 
the drug problems that she would be unable to render an 
impartial verdict. Counsel's failure to challenge her for 
cause "falls outside the range of professionally competent 
assistance." Smith v. Gearinger, 888 F.2d 1334, 1338 (11th 
Cir. 1989). Appellant further submits that the jury that found 
him guilty below was composed in part of a person whose state 
of mind prevented her from being impartial and that the 
presence on the jury of such a juror who has expressed such 
anger regarding the drug problem could well have operated to 
tip the verdict in a way that harmed appellant. 
Appellant further submits that counsel's error is not 
the type that can be characterized as a strategic maneuver. 
There is no strategy involved about counsel's decision to 
impanel a juror who has demonstrated her bias in such an angry 
state of mind who was never rehabilitated nor questioned 
further in any kind of detail by either the court or trial 
counsel. Inclusion of such a juror on the panel is tantamount 
to a denial of the right to a trial by jury. Appellant further 
submits that in this particular Sixth Amendment context> 
prejudice should be presumed. 
CONCLUSION 
Trial counsel's failure to challenge for cause Mrs. 
Swenson who expressed such a state of mind of being angry at 
the drug problems, denied appellant the effective assistance of 
counsel. This Court should, therefore, vacate appellant's 
convictions and sentences on Counts I, II and III and order 
they were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment and 
further order that the matter be reversed and a new trial held. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of January, 1991. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By^ 
Samtiel Alba 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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